In this paper we explore why incumbent firms fail to identify and address new markets in the face of disruptive technologies. We cross research on disruptive innovation with research on managerial cognition by exploring the role of managerial beliefs about customer needs in directing the search for new markets and product features. We show that a primary reason why incumbents lose their leadership is the inability to recognize either the rising 'social' market, where customers use products for fulfilling their need for friendship, or the 'esteem' market, where customers use products for fulfilling their need for achievement. We thus advance the disruptive innovation theory with regard to both the explanation and the anticipation of technology competition outcomes.
Introduction
Since professor Clayton Christensen first published research on disruptive technologies in 1997, his work has had a dramatic impact on business practice: disruptive innovation is now a common term of art. This theory played a key role in reigniting debate within academia on the difficulties of incumbent firms to respond to discontinuous technological changes.
Christensen's work has been cited extensively by scholars in diverse disciplines and research fields, including marketing, strategy, and technology and innovation management. However, despite the growing popularity of Christensen's work, there seems to be still a lack of understanding of the effects of disruptive technologies on firms and competition outcomes (Hang et al., 2014; Keller and Husig, 2009; Walsh et al., 2005) .
In this paper we explore how managerial cognition influences the market choices of organizations and thereby affects their long term performance in the face of disruptive
technologies. We address the following question: How do managerial beliefs about customer needs affect the capability of organizations to identify new markets in the face of disruptive technologies?
This paper is based on an in-depth, multiple case study of the mobile communication and imaging (printing) industries. Based on the lessons derived, we introduce the concepts of 'social' and 'esteem' markets: we show that the incumbent firms (Motorola and Kodak) failed to to identify these emerging markets, and we show the role of managerial beliefs in explaining their failure. We then apply our resulting conceptual framework to the smartphone industry: we consider which operating system will ultimately succeed, by comparing Microsoft's recently launched Windows 10 Mobile with Apple's iOS and Google's Android.
In this way we try to contribute to the disruptive innovation theory with regard to both the explanation and the anticipation of technology competition outcomes (Danneels, 2004; Linton, 2004 : Kostoff et al., 2004 .
Disruptive technologies, managerial cognition, and market choices

Disruptive technologies
Research on disruptive technologies emphasizes the influence of customer needs on industry dynamics and technology competition outcomes (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Phillips, 2001 ).
The concept of disruptive technologies was originally introduced by Christensen (1997) and Christensen and Bower (1996) : these are technologies that enable a new set of product features from those associated with mainstream technologies, and are initially inferior to the latter ones along one or two attributes ('mainstream features') that are particularly important to mainstream customers. Thus, in the early stage of their life cycle, disruptive technologies only serve niche segments that value their new kinds of attributes. However, as subsequent developments raise the disruptive technology's performance in mainstream attributes to a level sufficient to satisfy mainstream customers, the disruptive technology eventually 'invades' mainstream markets. The most powerful analytical tool Christensen (1997) provides for identifying a disruptive technology is his diagram which jointly plots for mainstream attributes: i) the performance trajectory provided by the disruptive technology; ii) and the performance trajectory demanded by the mainstream market. Since the performance trajectory provided by the disruptive technology is steeper than the performance trajectory demanded by the mainstream market, technology disruption occurs when the two intersect. Christensen's (1997) original explanation for the failure of leading firms draws on the resource dependence theory: he argues such failure is the result of incumbents' resource allocations processes, where incentive structures based on target product sales and margins lead them to disregard disruptive technologies and intensify their commitment to mainstream technologies.
Disruptive technologies and original explanations for the failure incumbents
However, later on scholars argued that the failure of incumbents may be due not to their inability to invest and adopt disruptive technologies in a timely manner, but rather to their inability to commercialize them successfully -i.e. to find new markets and provide customers with the new products and product features they actually want (Groen et al., 2008) .
According to Danneels (2004) , many incumbents have been able to develop working prototypes of products embedding an emerging disruptive technology, thus demonstrating that they have the necessary R&D capabilities to innovate. However, these incumbents lacked what Danneels (2004: 254) calls "the customer competence" to identify new customer groups that they had not served before. As he further developed the disruptive innovation theory, Christensen himself (2000, p. 58 ) revised his initial arguments for explaining the failure of incumbent firms, by noting that: "Professor Rebecca Henderson pointed out to me that this tendency always to take new technologies to mainstream customers reflects a rather narrow marketing competence -that although many scholars tend to frame the issue as one of technological competence, such inability to find new markets for new technologies may be a firm's most serious handicap in innovation" (italics in original). Christensen and Raynor (2003) and thus urged incumbents' managers to broaden their marketing scope, by looking for emerging customer needs and new markets (market niches/market segments) related to these needs. Specifically, Christensen and colleagues claimed that traditional market segmentation processes, which are based on such criteria as age, geographic regions or income, are likely to be of little use (for a review of market segmentation criteria see Dickson and Ginter, 1987) . They argued instead that people have 'jobs' which arise regularly and which they have to get done: these jobs represent the basic needs that customers try to satisfy by means of the products they use in their everyday life.
These jobs, i.e. these basic everyday needs, should constitute the cornerstone for the search for emerging markets in the face of disruptive technologies.
A new perspective on disruptive technologies and the failure of incumbents: the role of cognition
As they explore the likely reasons why incumbent firms lack the marketing competence to identify new markets for disruptive technologies, Hendersen (2006) and Danneels (2004) point to the mainstream research field of managerial cognition. This research field focuses on the role of managers' mental models/beliefs in explaining organizational responses to technological discontinuities (Garud and Rappa, 1994) .
Because of their bounded rationality, managers must rely on simplified representations of the business environment in order to process information about new events (Simon, 1955) .
These imperfect representations form the basis for the development of the mental models and strategic beliefs that drive managerial decisions. They influence the manner in which managers frame external changes and thus how they search for responses to these changes (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Kaplan, 2011) .
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Managerial beliefs are usually based on historical experience as opposed to current knowledge of the environment (Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008) . In changing industries, the influence of prior history often increases the difficulty that decision makers face when seeking to respond to new events, and this difficulty then often results in organizational inertia and poor performance. For instance, in the transition to digital imaging, Polaroid's commercialization strategy was driven and limited by beliefs resident in the analog photography business model (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000) . Similar effects have been found in 1 Since the early 2000s, the concept of managerial beliefs has been developed and measured according to two dominant approaches. Based on extensive field studies, one research stream typically uses data gathered from semi-structured interviews and firm archives to retrospectively explain how managerial beliefs led to a focal event, such as bankruptcy of Polaroid Corporation (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000) . The second research stream seeks to explain variations in firms' strategies by exploring the variation of CEOs' strategic beliefs. These studies take publically available documents, such as letters to shareholders in a firm's annual reports, as the proxies for the strategic thinking of CEOs and employ content analysis to uncover themes pertaining to managerial cognition and strategy (Nadkarni and Barr, 2008; Eggers and Kaplan, 2009). the shift from print to online newspapers (Gilbert, 2006) , in pharmaceutical firms' responses to the emergence of biotechnology (Kaplan et al., 2003) , and in communications technology firms' responses to fiber optics (Kaplan, 2008) .
Hence, when analyzing the determinants of incumbents' behavior in response to disruptive changes, managerial cognition should have a major role (Osiyevskyy and Dewald, 2015) . According to Danneels (2004) and Henderson (2006) , incumbents' managers might not understand the implications of disruptive technologies because their views of the world are deeply entrenched and largely shaped by their prior experiences of technologies and markets. These scholars thereby strongly suggest to cross research on disruptive innovation with research on managerial cognition.
However, thus far we still know very little about the impact of managers' mental models on the strategic responses of incumbent firms to disruptive technologies (Osiyevskyy and Dewald, 2015) . Our literature review uncovered a lack of empirical studies examining the relationship between managerial beliefs and the search processes for emerging markets. As such, there is a significant opportunity to expand our understanding of disruptive innovation and technology competition outcomes. In this paper we aim at seizing this opportunity. Our work is the first empirical study which crosses research on disruptive innovation with research on managerial cognition, by addressing the following question: How do managerial beliefs about customer needs affect the capability of organizations to identify new markets in the face of disruptive technologies? Table 1 illustrates the main contribution of our work, by highlighting the novelty and uniqueness of our framework compared with previous studies of disruptive innovation. The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we describe our research method.
In the subsequent section we illustrate the market choices of Motorola and Kodak and we compare these choices with those made by their rivals, Nokia and HP. Then we outline our resulting conceptual framework on managerial belief, customer needs, and technology competition outcomes.
Research Method
We used a multiple-case research design (Eisenhardt, 1989) : given the gap in extant literature and the open-ended nature of our research questions, we felt this methodological approach would be the most useful for expanding the disruptive innovation theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Yin, 2003) . Multiple cases allow a replication logic in which each is treated as an experiment, serving to confirm or disconfirm inferences drawn from the others (Eisenhardt and Grabner, 2007) . (Christensen and Raynor, 2003; . In both industries the incumbent firm (i.e., the original leader) and the entrant firm (i.e., the rising leader) targeted very different markets and customer needs through their products: our case firms thus represent "polar" companies which are particularly suitable for observing contrasting patterns in the data (Eisenhardt and Grabner, 2007) . Table 2 summarizes our empirical setting. 
Research setting
Data collection
We focused our data collection on tracking major markets, products and product features, relying on two primary data sources: archives and interviews. We gathered extensive archival data for each firm -incumbents and challengers -exploiting both internal and external sources, including annual reports, press releases, internal reports and presentations, video and audio archives of executive presentations, internal memos, technical papers, media articles etc., (collected via tools such as ABI Inform), complemented with analyst reports and books about the firms (Steinbock, 2001 InfoTrends -provided extensive data about worldwide and regional market sales in our two case industries, and about the market shares of each of our selected companies. Semistructured interviews with internal and external informants were our second main data source.
Internal informants included managers and executives selected according to their hierarchical and functional position and their direct involvement in the development and commercialization of the new technologies and products. External informants included senior executives from business partners and competitors, and industry specialists and consultants.
Data analysis
Data analysis was also highly iterative and used traditional case study research approaches (Yin, 2003) . Our research question shaped our data collection plan and thus gave priorities to the analytical process, which was based on a cluster methodology where common words and topics were gradually identified (Aldenderfer and Blashfield, 1984) . Cluster labels included managerial beliefs and markets (see Table 3 ). We followed an iterative process of cycling between theory, our data and the extant literature on innovation to refine our findings, relate them to existing theories, and clarify our contributions (Eisenhardt, 1989) . A cluster is a group of objects which are similar among them and are dissimilar to the objects of other clusters.
Clustering process
Matching managerial beliefs of incumbent firms (and their rivals) with descriptive concepts (i.e. clusters) about the basic needs and markets these companies targeted through their new products and product features in the face of disruptive technologies
Results
Notwithstanding that they developed the same new disruptive technologies, the incumbent firm and its challenger within each industry identified and addressed completely different markets and customer needs: they thus developed quite different products. (early 1990s -early 2000s) 4.1.1 Motorola. Motorola managers firmly believed mobile phones responded to people's need to improve their efficiency and performance. A former senior director illustrated: as an analog version in 1989, with GSM-compatible versions following in 1994. These phones introduced an innovative design which allowed to save space and weight: Motorola engineers placed part of the phone's hardware (e.g., the mouthpiece) in a hinged section at its base. Such section could fold inward or outward as needed over the keypad, so reducing the phone size when it was not in use. When they were released, the MicroTAC models were by far the smallest and lightest phones available. The StarTAC, the successor to the MicroTAC released in early 1996, was the first ever 'clamshell' mobile phone. While the MicroTAC's shell folded out from below the keypad, the StarTAC folded from the top down over the display: optimized for ease handling and compact size, it was another breakthrough design concept in the industry. To introduce the StarTAC, the 1995 annual report shows a businessman talking on the phone in front of the Pantheon, while the accompanying text reads:
Mobile communication
The 
Nokia claims 'Connecting people' reflects the heart of the company's mission -to help people cultivate their social relationships via their mobile phones.
Throughout the 1990s, Nokia's annual reports showed pictures of people (like Motorola's target business users) using their mobile phones in order to stay in touch with family and friends while away from home -rather than for communicating with colleagues while away from office. In the 1995 annual report, an exemplar comic-strip story placed immediately after the CEO's letter to shareholders illustrated this social kind of use of mobile phones:
In the modern family, people do their own thing. Mum may be away on business, Dad's driving long distance, Junior's at home... but that doesn't mean you can't stay in touch". […] Junior says: "My Mum's away on business. I sort of miss her".[…] Just then Mum calls [through its mobile device]: "Hi, how are you! Eating properly?" Junior replies "Er yes, we've got a freezer full of food…"(emphasis added)
The comic-strip's end-caption reinforced the company mission: "Nokia…connecting people". In providing these features, Nokia released relatively bulky products, which could not compete in terms of weight and size with Motorola's clamshell phones: Nokia's phones were candybar models (i.e. monoblock, taking the shape of a cuboid and having the display and keypad all on the same face), with a smooth, rounded and stylish look that rapidly became their hallmark. An internal Nokia Design Team report outlines the company's basic design principles as follows:
Less than a decade ago [mid 1990s] Nokia launched a wide stream of representative models featuring these attributes throughout the 1990s: the 2100 (1994), the 3100 (1997), the 5110 (1997), the 3210 (1999), the 3310 DPI. 9 The quality of these pictures thereby was relatively good but clearly inferior compared with Kodak's kiosks.
Imaging (printing)
A Framework for Social and Esteem Markets (Product Categories), Managerial Beliefs, and Technology Competition Outcomes
In the previous section we outlined the different markets and customer needs that incumbent firms and their challengers addressed in the face of disruptive technologies. Table 4 summarizes the empirical evidence from our case studies. A clear and highly consistent pattern emerged in our data. This regards the co-evolution and mutual influences, in each case industry, of two specific and very different kinds of markets for mobile phones, on the one hand, and printed images, on the other hand: these are the social market and the esteem market.
Mainstream literature defines a set of products designed to serve the same need -and market -as a 'product category' (see for instance Aaker and Keller, 1990; Lambkin and Day, 1989) . For the sake of clarity, in the paper we define a class of products which customers use for addressing their need for achievements and recognition (e.g. in their work or hobby activities), as an 'esteem' product category. Accordingly, we define a group of customers that use a given product category (e.g., mobile phone) for fulfilling their need for achievement and recognition, as the "esteem market" for that product category. We define as well a class of products which customers use for addressing their need for social relationships, as a 'social' product category; and we define a group of customers that use a given product category (e.g., mobile phone) for improving their social relationships, as the "social market"
for that product category.
Our characterization of the esteem and the social markets/product categories is fully consistent with the recommendation of Christensen and colleagues (Christensen and Raynor, 2003; to focus on the basic needs that customers try to satisfy through the products they use in their everyday life. We thus clearly set apart our empirical investigation from the traditional segmentation criteria used in marketing research such as age, geographic regions or income. Precisely, we borrowed the terms 'esteem' and 'social' markets from Maslow's (1954) theory on needs hierarchy, which emphasized that most of people during their lives experience both the need for social relationship (love, friendship, intimacy) and the need for esteem (achievement and results, status and recognition, respect by others): we relate a specific market/product category to each specific need.
Technological change and the rise of new social or esteem markets
A key issue which clearly resulted from our data is the disruptive impact that the new technologies (1G together with 2G in mobile communication; and digital imaging in the imaging industry) had on the mainstream markets and product categories which had been historically served by incumbent firms.
In both the mobile communication industry and the imaging industry the new technologies enabled completely new markets (and product categories) to emerge: the social market in the first industry, whereas the traditional market was the esteem one; and the esteem market in the second industry, whereas the traditional market was the social one.
Incumbent firms (i.e. Motorola and Kodak) that previously had made either esteem products or social products were able to adopt and to launch disruptive technologies promptly. But, contrary to their challengers, incumbents were not able to renew their target markets and product categories as well: Motorola failed to select and develop the emerging social markets where customers started using mobile phones for cultivating social relationships; and Kodak failed to indentify the esteem market where customers started using printed images for improving their work or hobby achievements.
Both these rising markets were boosted by the new technologies -and could not be fulfilled by the previous mainstream technologies. Prahalad and Bettis (1986) and Kaplan and Tripsas (2008) argue that managers' prior history and experience make up the 'technological frames' through which they make sense of a (new) technology, and that these technological frames are encoded in a shared set of beliefs -commonly referred to as a 'dominant logic' -that is unique to a given firm. Our findings suggest that the strategic beliefs, which managers developed about the social (or, vice versa, esteem) market/need they had traditionally served, are typical manifestations of such dominant logic. Managerial beliefs about the social (or, vice versa, esteem) market did not prevent incumbent firms from identifying and engaging with disruptive technologies; however, these mental models prevented incumbent firms from identifying the emerging esteem (or, vice versa, social) market, by restricting their search and sensemaking exactly to the social (or, vice versa, esteem) market they had served previously.
Mobile Communication (early 1990s -early 2000s).
To consider mobile communication: various products -two-way radios, pagers and eventually car phones -had been developed since the 1930s to make mobile communications available anytime and anywhere. But all these devices -and their underlying mainstream radio communication technologies which preceded 1G and 2G -had clear intrinsic limits. Two-way radios allowed customers to talk only to a restricted number of people and only across a limited distance; pagers did not allow users to talk directly but required fixed-line phones, so that calls were constrained by the public nature of these phones which were usually shared with colleagues or family members; car phones were not really portable. Within their limits these devices were functional to business executives and professionals who could use them profitably for fulfilling the need to perform their work tasks on the move so as to increase their productivity (esteem market -product category -for pagers, two way radios, car phones).
Before the advent of mobile phones, Motorola had marketed exactly two-way radios (the first dating back to 1939), car phones (1946) and pagers (1956) . The company still makes these products today, with its web site defining them as devices which can "help improve business productivity […] : portable and mobile two-way radios and pagers offers solutions that better enable you to efficiently coordinate and communicate with your on-thego workforce" 10 .
At the time it started introducing its mobile phones, its 1990 annual report stresses:
In 1990 Motorola improved the way the world communicates. Drawing on the broadest portfolio of semiconductors in the world, we introduced electronics products, systems and services designed to make our customers more productive.
while the cover shows a guard using a two-way radio in front of the Louvre; the caption explains:
One of the newest landmarks in Paris is architect I.M. Pei's pyramid entrance to the Louvre. Guards from Erom Sécurité S.A. use Motorola two-way communications equipment at the museum to protect some of the finest art treasures in the world.
Such data show how Motorola intended its two-way radios and pagers as an esteem product category aimed at serving customers when trying to improve their achievements and recognition (i.e. 'productivity' and 'efficiency' according to Motorola). Thanks to its longstanding experience with two-way radios, pagers and car phones, Motorola had clearly developed deeply-rooted managerial beliefs about the linkages between the 'esteem' need and mobile communication technologies. So when it launched its 1G and 2G mobile phones, Motorola still addressed the same customers' need for improving work achievements and the same esteem market it had traditionally served through the previous two-way radios and pager technologies. Coherently, it selected answering machine, call forwarding, voice mail, phone book, vibracall, and ergonomic and compact 'clamshell' design as its target product features and product design for fulfilling at best this esteem market and need.
But the advent of 1G and 2G wireless technologies signaled a major shift in the need and market that mobile communication tools could address compared with two-way radios and pagers. The new 1G and 2G based mobile devices, i.e. mobile phones, solved all the limits of pagers, two-ray radios, and car phones: mobile phones were personal communication tools which enabled customers to talk one with each other directly, anytime, anywhere, so that calls could remain private and their content confidential. Mobile phones thus fostered new ways -in particular, text messages (SMS) -to pursue friendship, relationships and love: they were a sort of repository of private communications and the personal emotions linked with these communications. This concept of mobile phones as a new product category which customers could use for enhancing their social relationships, was exactly at the heart of Nokia's design vision:
A mobile phone, device or enhancement is much more than a piece of electronics: it is a personal object. You keep it close to you, you tell it personal and intimate things, you use it when and where you want. It reflects your mood and personality and is in tune with your interests and attitudes. All of this separates it from the world of wired products, fixed locations and the conventions of how things have been done. All this makes it an object that embraces innovation and design and is a reflection of the changing lives we live. 11
Digital imaging (printing).
During the 20 th century the analog technology of the camera and roll film system had opened the doors to the mass production of images and created a large amateur market of customers as photographers. But this technological paradigm had still limited what people could do in terms of elaborating and using images: roll film system required ordinary customers to print their images without any substantial modification and to store them in picture frames or albums to share with family and friends visiting their homes.
Analogue film technology thus was well-suited to private moments and personal events, a perfect example of answering the need for social relationships.
During the 20 th century, Kodak had pioneered the camera and roll film system. Thanks such longstanding experience, Kodak had clearly inherited deeply-rooted managerial beliefs about the linkages between the social market for pictures and imaging technologies. As a result, when it had to commercialize digital imaging, Kodak aimed to enable people to make images celebrating important moments of their personal lives and invested in kiosks at retailers where they could continue to get high quality pictures to store in picture frames or albums: this was exactly the social product category, i.e., social market of printed images, that the company had traditionally served within the previous film technological paradigm. 
Disruptive innovation dynamics in social and esteem markets
In both our case industries, the products that were designed for the new and emerging social (or, vice versa, esteem) market evolved so that they disrupted the products designed for the mainstream esteem (or, vice versa, social) market. We describe here the disruptive dynamics which affected the social market vs. the esteem market for mobile phones and printed images.
Following Christensen (1997) Initially, in both industries these differences in performance trajectories kept separated the esteem market from the social one. However, in both the mobile communication and the imaging industries, the product solutions designed by Nokia and HP evolved over time so that they eventually matched the requirements for mainstream features in the traditional markets targeted by Motorola and Kodak. This paved the way for the migration of Motorola's and Kodak's customers to their rivals Nokia and HP. Maslow (1954) emphasized that most of people during their lives experience both the need for social relationships and the need for esteem: indeed most human beings are members of both a) a family and a social network in which they aim at enhancing their feelings of love and friendship; b) an organization in which they carry out work or hobby activities for enhancing their achievements, status and recognition. This means that most people need both products for enhancing their social relationships and products for enhancing their esteem. As a result, it is clear that when Nokia's candybar phones and HP printers enabled users to fulfill both their social need for relationships and esteem need for achievements, these phones and printers appealed to Motorola's and Kodak's mainstream customers.
Mobile communication (early 1990s -early 2000s). The case of mobile communication
illustrates very well disruptive dynamics in social and esteem markets. The trajectories in Figure 1 were derived from the main products that developed from the late 1980s until the early 2000s, the design concept of each company and its related product features. These products are: in case of Motorola, MicroTAC 9800X (released in 1989, weighing 348 grams), MicroTAC Lite (1991 , 218g), MicroTAC Classic (1991 , 196g), MicroTAC Ultratite (1992 , 167g), MicroTAC Elite (1994 , StartTAC (1996, 88) , Figure 1 shows that Nokia's products were able to approximate over time the weight performance of Motorola's ones. Nokia could easily embed as well Motorola's additional features (e.g., vibracall, voice mail, call forwarding) into its products, allowing them to fulfill both customers' demand for productivity (esteem market of mobile devices) and their growing demand for social relationship (social market). Global market data clearly show that Motorola's target customers quickly shifted towards StarTAC 70 (1997 , 125g), StarTAC 75 (1997 , 112g), StarTAC 130 (1998 ; in case of Nokia, 1011 Nokia, (1992 Nokia, , 475g), 2110 Nokia, (1995 Nokia, , 236g), 3110 (1997 Nokia, , 187g), 5110 (1998 Nokia, , 170g), 3210 (1999 3310 (2000 , 133g), 3410 (2001 . The slight increase of weight in the StarTAC series between 1996 and 1997 is due to the shift from analog (1G) to digital (2G) wireless technologies. On the basis of the empirical data reported in Figure 1 and Table industry (see Christensen and Bower, 1996: 204) : the main difference is that we focus on the performance trajectories related to product design concepts, meant for either the disruptive Kodak's targeted in relation to the social market for printed images, thereby, could start using HP's home and office printers to make the high quality pictures they required. As HP's 
Discussion
The main contribution of this paper is to expand our understanding of the disruptive innovation theory with regard to the key issue of why incumbent firms fail to identify emerging markets, products and product features (Christensen 1997; Charitou and Markides, 2003; Sabatier et al., 2012) . Building on the efforts of previous scholars in the field of cognition, we explore how managers develop over time their strategic beliefs about customers needs and we show the importance of these beliefs in directing the market responses of incumbents to disruptive technological change (Henderson, 2006; Osiyevskyy and Dewald, 2015) . Overall, we thus add to the study of the implications of disruptive innovation for established firms, new entrants, customers, and entire business ecosystems. Christensen and Raynor (2003) urged practitioners and scholars to look for the "jobs", i.e., the basic needs, that customers try to get done through the products they use in everyday life, by arguing that these basic needs are the cornerstone for the successful selection of new markets in the face of disruptive technologies. However, Christensen and colleagues did not identify well-defined cases of basic needs (and related markets) which are systematically affected by disruptive innovation.
Our work bridges exactly this gap. We identify the social and esteem markets for mobile communication devices and images, i.e., the social and esteem needs that customers try to get done by means of both these classes of products. We show that because senior managers of Motorola (Kodak) had contributed to the establishment of previous technologies serving only the esteem (social) need/market, they held strong beliefs about this esteem (social) market.
Such strategic beliefs were the typical manifestation of the 'dominant logic' described by Prahalad and Bettis (1986) and Kaplan and Tripsas (2008) : they prevented Motorola's (Kodak's) managers from selecting the new social (esteem) market where disruptive technologies could be successfully used (Henderson, 2006) .
We suggest that, similarly to the cases of the mobile communication and the imaging businesses, in several high-tech industries established technologies -and related productsmight be currently serving only either the esteem or the social basic need of customers.
Thereby, similarly to Motorola and Kodak, the managers of incumbent firms in these industries might hold strong beliefs about either the esteem or social market they have historically served. In the face of disruptive technologies, the future success -or even survival -of these firms thus depends on the capability of their top managers to recognize and change such markets and strategic beliefs: our findings in this paper represent a first, essential toward this change. At the same time, through our conceptual framework we aim at improving the use of the disruptive innovation theory with regard to the anticipation of technology competition outcomes Dixon et al., 2014; Govindarajan and Kopalle, 2006 Windows 10 in the PC industry and contextually to increase the number of apps running on its Windows 10 mobile-based smartphones, the company will match as well customers' demand for social relationships. We thus suggest to monitor closely the number of apps that are being the commercialization of disruptive technologies.
As we focus on the mobile communication industry (together with the case of digital imaging), we bring a fresh perspective on competition outcomes in this industry between the early 1990s and the early 2000s. The rise of Nokia over Motorola has been largely studied in literature on innovation: before us, scholars focused in particular on the role in such rise of geographically differentiated markets (US vs. EU) and standards (2G vs.1G) (Berggren and Laestadius, 2003; Steinbock, 2001) . Our research aims to complement the work of previous scholars, by exploring the role of disruptive innovation instead. Furthermore, our research explores current and future competition outcomes in the fast-paced mobile communication business.
We borrow our definition of esteem and social product categories from Maslow's hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1954) . We suggest that future research efforts of scholars should build on Maslow's classification of needs (i.e. physiological, safety, social relationships, esteem, and self-actualization) in order to identify and investigate new pairs of markets for everyday life products which are subject to mutual disruption over time, exactly as the cases of social and esteem markets/products.
Our research setting, data collection, and data analysis were designed to enhance the construct and internal validity of our theoretical framework. Data triangulation between different sources and pattern-matching across multiple cases (literal replication) improved the reliability and external validity of our propositions (Yin, 2003) . At the same time, in terms of robustness and generalization, it is critical to note that our work is based on a limited number of companies: the usual limitations of case study research apply thereby to our work. We selected our theoretical sample according to the main purpose of this paper that is, as typical of case study research, to develop theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) . The next step is to test our conceptual framework empirically by means of more cases and thus through a statistical (e.g.,
